Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02

[feclnogn]

Well this is interesting. I saw some clips from Clarkes testimony today, and I really get the feeling this guy is not being honest, especially when he was being questioned on this transcript vs. his book.

WASHINGTON — The following transcript documents a background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his post in January 2003.



RICHARD CLARKE: Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.

Second point is that the Clinton administration had a strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they remained on the table when that administration went out of office — issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy -- uh, changing our policy toward Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy. They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not been decided on in a couple of years.

And the third point is the Bush administration decided then, you know, in late January, to do two things. One, vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to some extent.

And the point is, while this big review was going on, there were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them decided.

So, point five, that process which was initiated in the first week in February, uh, decided in principle, uh in the spring to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five-fold, to go after Al Qaeda.

The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies — and you had to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late March, early April. The deputies then tasked the development of the implementation details, uh, of these new decisions that they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals.

Over the course of the summer — last point — they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance.

And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.

QUESTION: When was that presented to the president?

CLARKE: Well, the president was briefed throughout this process.

QUESTION: But when was the final September 4 document? (interrupted) Was that presented to the president?

CLARKE: The document went to the president on September 10, I think.

QUESTION: What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus against the — general animus against the foreign policy?

CLARKE: I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous team to me.

JIM ANGLE: You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct?

CLARKE: All of that's correct.

ANGLE: OK.

link


The plot thickens

 

[Erik in AK]

Question(rhetorical?)

What was Mr. Clarke's role on the Clinton Administration's decision to blow off Sudan's offer to capture and turn OBL over to the U.S.? This, of course, occurred after WJC had already declared OBL the single greatest threat to American lives.

 

[JoseCuervo]

QUESTION: And then, can I ask you to clarify, too, because one of the points you've made is he was here for nearly a decade; why did he raise these concerns -- why did he raise these concerns a year-and-a-half after he left? What, then, was the report that he put together that, then, was on the President's desk September 4th, the action plan in terms of doing --
McCLELLAN: Well, that was something the National Security Council put together. That was something -- it was a comprehensive strategy for eliminating al Qaeda, not rolling back al Qaeda. The President wanted a strategy that had teeth, that when we came in and we looked at -- looked at the threat posed by al Qaeda, we made it a top priority. But the President wanted to go beyond the actions of the past, which were maybe aimed at rolling back al Qaeda. He wanted a comprehensive strategy that had teeth. That's why we made al Qaeda a priority from very early on.

And then you also look at what we did after 9/11. We immediately took action to go into Afghanistan and remove the Taliban from power and to deny al Qaeda the safe haven that they had in that country to plan and plot against America and our friends and allies.

QUESTION: But you have left the impression that Clarke did little or nothing to deal with or propose solutions to dealing with al Qaeda while he was here.

McCLELLAN: No, no, no. Here in the United States. No, no. Dr. Rice actually asked him for ideas in the very first week of this administration that he had for going after al Qaeda. And some of those -- some of those we pursued --

QUESTION: Wasn't he the one who pushed in many ways and helped put together the report that landed on the President's desk September 4th?

McCLELLAN: He was involved in our counterterrorism efforts up until October 9th of 2001, when that position was separated, something that he actually suggested, as well.

QUESTION: Well, help clarify, because if he was involved with and helped author this report that had to deal with dealing with al Qaeda that landed on the President's desk a week before September 11th --

McCLELLAN: At the direction of --

QUESTION: -- how can you say he did nothing or raised no concerns?

McCLELLAN: At the direction of -- at the direction of the National Security Advisor. I'm talking about here in the United States. Remember that the fact is that he was not in many of the meetings where he would have some of the direct knowledge of what he asserts. He appears to be more wrapped up in the process about what title he had and what meetings he was able to participate in or not participate in. The world according to Dick Clarke is all about Dick Clarke. If he and his ideas are not at the center of all that is going on, then he thinks you cannot be taking terrorism seriously.

Well, let's look at the facts. Let's look at the action we took. This President took action immediately upon coming into office to develop a comprehensive strategy to eliminate al Qaeda. The first major foreign policy directive of this administration was a comprehensive -- to develop a comprehensive strategy to eliminate al Qaeda, not to roll back al Qaeda.

QUESTION: Understood, but explain how there's not a glaring contradiction. You say he did nothing, and yet there was a report that was on the President's desk a week before September 11th.

McCLELLAN: What did I say? Wait, wait. What did I say? I did not say --

QUESTION: You said he was more involved in process and which meetings he was in. I’m trying to understand --

McCLELLAN: He is more focused on -- he appears to be more focused on process and what title he had and what meetings he was in or not in.

QUESTION: What was the report on September 4th?

McCLELLAN: That was the comprehensive strategy to eliminate al Qaeda, at the direction of Dr. Rice and the National Security Council and the President of the United States, who made it clear early on. He said, I don't want to be swatting at flies, we need a comprehensive strategy to eliminate al Qaeda.